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Abstract:   
The long-run relation between growth and inflation has not yet been studied in the 
context of nominal price and wage rigidities, despite the fact that these rigidities now 
figure prominently in workhorse macroeconomic models. We therefore integrate 
staggered price- and wage-setting into an endogenous growth framework. In this setting, 
growth and inflation are linked via the incentive to innovate. For standard calibrations, 
the linkage is strong: as trend inflation shifts from -5 to 5 percent, the range over which 
the economy’s steady-state growth rate varies spans 50 basis points, implying up to a 
15 percent output differential after thirty years. Nominal wage rigidity plays a critical role 
in generating these results, and compounding of inflation’s growth effects implies large 
welfare losses. Endogenous growth thus proves a key channel via which inflation 
impacts New Keynesian economies. 
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1 Introduction
The long-run relation between growth and inflation is a key topic in macroeconomics. However,
it has not yet been studied in the context of nominal price and wage rigidities, despite the fact
that these rigidities now figure prominently in workhorse macroeconomic models for research
and policy.1 We take a first step in addressing this apparent gap in the literature by integrating
staggered price- and wage-setting into a benchmark endogenous growth framework. This
marriage delivers a strong growth-inflation linkage, suggesting an important channel via which
inflation affects New Keynesian economies.
Our model features Taylor price and wage contracts, along with endogenous growth through
expanding variety, as in Romer (1990). Monopolistically competitive firms supply a range of
intermediate goods, and growth occurs as innovators design new varieties of these goods;
as compensation, innovators receive equity in the intermediate good-producing sector. The
sector’s profits then serve as a link between growth and inflation, since real profits represent an
incentive for innovation but are sensitive to inflation due to the presence of nominal rigidities.
Acting via this mechanism, inflation exerts a strong influence on long-run growth. Under
our baseline calibration, shifting trend inflation from −5 to 5% per annum causes the annu-
alized growth rate to vary within a 50 basis point range. Over thirty years, this implies as
much as a 15% differential in output.
Nominal wage rigidity plays a critical role in generating these results. We find that infla-
tion’s impact on profits — and growth in turn — owes not so much to the distortive effects
of price rigidity as to a somewhat unremarked consequence of wage rigidity. More specifically,
with staggered wage-setting, changes in the trend rate of inflation elicit dramatic adjustments
in the volume of labor available to complement intermediate goods, with strong implications
for profits and growth. This “labor supply effect” so dominates the growth-inflation linkage
that an experiment abstracting from wage rigidity fails to deliver a quantitatively significant
relation between growth and inflation.
Aside from its effect on growth, inflation also has a dramatic impact on welfare, consistent
with Lucas (1988), who argues, due to compounding, that policy choices should have strong
welfare effects if they influence long-run growth. As we vary trend inflation from −5 to 5%
under our baseline calibration, consumption-equivalent welfare losses reach up to 6%, with
most of these losses specifically attributable to inflation’s effect on growth. Based on these
results, we conclude that endogenous growth is an important channel via which inflation affects
New Keynesian economies and that its omission may understate the welfare costs of inflation.
In terms of related literature, this paper extends several theoretical inquiries into the
growth-inflation nexus. Our main contribution is our emphasis on nominal price and wage
rigidities, since pre-existing models for the nexus tend to abstract from nominal inertia. Most
instead subvert superneutrality by assuming a transactions role for money. Examples include
Gomme (1993), Marquis and Reffett (1994), Jones and Manuelli (1995), Dotsey and Ireland
(1996), Wu and Zhang (1998), Dotsey and Sarte (2000), Zhang (2000), and Gillman and Kejak
1Variants of the so-called New Keynesian model have been used to study other important monetary policy
questions such as optimal monetary policy rules, zero bound on nominal interest rates, desirability of inflation
targeting, optimal policy under discretion and commitment, etc. Moreover, the New Keynesian framework
underpins the new generation of medium-scale macroeconomic models used in central banks as well as in
the broader macroeconomic research community, and provides theoretical support to the inflation-stability
strategies adopted by the majority of monetary policymakers in the industrialized world.
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Our work is also related to another literature concerning the importance of nominal wage
inertia. In stochastic settings featuring price and wage rigidities, Erceg et al. (2000) show
that wage rigidity has strong implications for optimal monetary policy, while Huang and Liu
(2002) show that sticky wages are more likely to effect business cycle persistence than are
sticky prices. In an effort to match empirical responses to monetary policy shocks, Christiano
et al. (2005) find that wage rigidity is essential to the replication of key data moments. More
recently, in a deterministic model embedding exogenous productivity growth, Amano et al.
(2009) find that wage rigidity dominates price rigidity in terms of its implications for welfare
and optimal inflation. We extend these findings by showing that nominal wage rigidity is
essential to a New Keynesian model’s capacity to deliver a strong growth-inflation linkage.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces our model.
Section 3 characterizes and solves for the balanced growth path. We calibrate in section 4.
In section 5, we present and discuss our findings, while section 6 provides sensitivity analysis.
We conclude in section 7.
2 Model
This section presents a discrete-time, general-equilibrium model that links growth and inflation
by integrating staggered price- and wage-setting into an endogenous growth framework. The
model economy’s real structure is based on an extension of Romer (1990) while its nominal
rigidities take the form of Taylor (1980) price and wage contracts.3 In this section, we describe
each of the economy’s five agents — namely final and intermediate good-producing firms, a
representative household, an innovator, and a government responsible for setting fiscal and
monetary policy — before closing with a market-clearing condition.
2.1 Final good production
Final output Yt is produced using the technology
Yt = L
1−α
t X
α
t
where
Xt =
(∫ Nt
0
X
σ−1
σ
jt dj
) σ
σ−1
is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate over a range of intermediate goods. Nt measures the variety of
these goods available in period t, while σ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties, and
2Alternate approaches rely on inflation’s redistributive effects (Mino and Shibata, 1995, 2000), its role in
public finance (de Gregorio, 1993; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1995) and its interaction with financial frictions
(Chari et al. 1996, Ho 1996, Haslag 1998, Bose 2002, Chang et al. 2007). To our knowledge, the only pre-
existing models that embed some form of nominal rigidity are Jones and Manuelli (1995) and Funk and Kromen
(2010). Jones and Manuelli consider rigidities in the tax system, while Funk and Kromen consider sticky goods
prices in isolation.
3We use Taylor contracts instead of Calvo (1983) contracts in light of evidence from Ascari (2004) that
contracts of the former type are better suited to the study of inflation’s macroeconomic effects when trend
inflation is non-zero.
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Xjt is the output of intermediate good j. Similarly,
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
L
θ−1
θ
it di
) θ
θ−1
is an aggregate over a (fixed) range of differentiated labor services, with Lit denoting the
quantity of service i and θ denoting the elasticity of substitution across services.
The final good-producing sector is perfectly competitive, with firms choosing their inputs
to maximize profits
PtYt −
∫ Nt
0
PjtXjtdj −
∫ 1
0
WitLitdi
where Pt is the price of final output, Pjt is the price of intermediate good j, and Wit is a
service-specific wage. The first-order condition for Xjt is then
Xjt =
[
αL1−αt
(
Pjt
Pt
)−1]σ
X
1−σ(1−α)
t
which implies that final good producers demand the aggregate Xt according to
Xt = N
1
(σ−1)(1−α)
t
(
α
∆Pt
) 1
1−α
Lt
where
∆Pt =
[
1
Nt
∫ Nt
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)1−σ
dj
] 1
1−σ
measures the average real price at which intermediate goods sell. Similarly, the first-order
condition on Lit is
Lit =
[
(1− α)Xαt
(
Wit
Pt
)−1]θ
L1−θαt
which implies that
Lt =
1− α
∆Wt /Yt
(1)
where
∆Wt =
[∫ 1
0
(
Wit
Pt
)1−θ
di
] 1
1−θ
gives the average real wage at which labor services are hired.
2.2 Intermediate good production
Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms that set prices using
Taylor contracts. These contracts last J periods, and firms are uniformly distributed across
pricing cohorts. The sector operates a simple technology that generates one unit of a given
intermediate good from one unit of final output.
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Let P ∗t be the nominal price set by firms re-optimizing in period t. Suppose that firm j is
one such re-optimizer and that P ∗t elicits demand Xjt (P
∗
t ) for its output. Firm j then chooses
P ∗t to maximize the real discounted value of the profits generated over the duration of the
contract,
J−1∑
τ=0
βτ
(
λt+τ
λt
)(
P ∗t (1 + s
X)
Pt+τ
− 1
)
Xj,t+τ (P
∗
t )
where β and λt are the shareholders’ discount factor and marginal utility of real income,
respectively, and sX is a subsidy. The first-order condition is
P ∗t =
σ/(1 + sX)
σ − 1
(∑J−1
τ=0 β
τλt+τP
σ
t+τX
1−σ(1−α)
t+τ L
σ(1−α)
t+τ∑J−1
τ=0 β
τλt+τP
σ−1
t+τ X
1−σ(1−α)
t+τ L
σ(1−α)
t+τ
)
(2)
2.3 Households and labor
We assume the presence of a multi-agent, infinitely lived representative household that aims
to maximize discounted utility
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
logCt − 1
1 + ν
∫ 1
0
L1+νit di
)
subject to the following budget constraint, which is presented in real terms:
Ct + (1− sI)It + Tt + Bt
Pt
= Dt +
1 + sL
Pt
∫ 1
0
WitLitdi+
Bt−1(1 + rt−1)
Pt
where Ct and It are consumption and investment in “research and development” (R&D), while
Tt is a lump-sum tax. Bt denotes nominal holdings in one-period government bonds, which
pay interest at risk-free rate rt. Dt denotes dividends, while s
I and sL are subsidies (discussed
below). Thus, the constraint’s left-hand side gives household expenditures, while the right-
hand side gives revenues, including dividends, wage receipts, and the return on last period’s
lending.
In the labor market, we assume that each member i (i ∈ [0, 1]) of the extended household
supplies Lit units of differentiated labor and service-specific wages are set in a monopolistically
competitive market using Taylor contracts. These contracts last I periods, and services are
uniformly distributed across wage-setting cohorts. The wage charged for services with con-
tracts resetting in period t, W ∗t , is then chosen to satisfy the following first-order condition:
(W ∗t )
1+θν =
θ(1− α)θν/(1 + sL)
θ − 1
(∑I−1
τ=0 β
τP
θ(1+ν)
t+τ X
αθ(1+ν)
t+τ L
(1−αθ)(1+ν)
t+τ∑I−1
τ=0 β
τλt+τP
θ−1
t+τ X
αθ
t+τL
1−θα
t+τ
)
(3)
2.4 Innovation
The household designs new varieties of intermediate goods using an R&D technology due
to Evans et al. (1998). In period t, this technology enables the innovator to develop inter-
mediate good j ∈ (Nt, Nt+1] at real cost ηjξ. R&D thus causes variety Nt to rise over time,
which drives the growth process.
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Once a new variety has been designed, the design is patented and the patent sold to
a prospective intermediate good producer. In return, the household-cum-innovator receives
equity. We assume that the innovator is unaware of the pricing cohort in which the producer
will operate and that new patents are uniformly distributed across cohorts. Therefore, the
innovator expects that a patent designed in period t will yield
Ps =
1
Ns
∫ Ns
0
Pjsdj
in real dividends in each period s ≥ t + 1, where Pjs denotes the real profits that producer j
generates in period s.
Balancing these dividends against the up-front cost of R&D, the investment
It = η
∫ Nt+1
Nt
jξdj
will satisfy the following zero-profit condition:
(1− sI)ηN ξt+1 =
∞∑
τ=1
βτ
(
λt+τ
λt
)
Pt+τ (4)
2.5 Government
Government’s key role in this economy is to set the rate of trend inflation, pi = Pt+1/Pt. Since
this paper focuses on the long-run relation between growth and inflation and thus restricts
attention to the economy’s balanced growth path, we do not need to specify the monetary
policy implementing pi. That is, pi can be viewed as being set using an interest rate rule or
through money growth targeting.
Government also sets fiscal policy. We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and others in using fiscal
policy to offset the effects of imperfect competition, thus isolating the effects of nominal rigidity
for later discussion. This requires that we characterize optimal fiscal policy in the special
case of a flexible economy with price and wage contracts lasting J = I = 1 period. With
monopolistic distortions constraining the supply of labor services and intermediate goods,
this policy involves the following subsidies:
sX =
1
σ − 1 (5)
sL =
1
θ − 1 (6)
A novel issue arises because our model features an additional source of distortion aside from
nominal rigidity and imperfect competition. In particular, there are externalities associated
with innovation: the development of the marginal design has an effect on the productivity of
inframarginal designs in a sense that we make precise in section 3. We offset this effect using
the investment subsidy so as to maintain our focus on nominal rigidity:
sI =
β
(
λt+1
λt
) 1−σ(1−α)
α
[(
λt+1
λt
) (σ−1)(1−α)
α − 1
]
1− β
(
λt+1
λt
) 1−σ(1−α)
α
(7)
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With fiscal policy set according to equations 5 through 7, it can be verified that the flexible
economy recovers its first-best path. With subsidies set in this fashion, the government then
chooses lump-sum transfer Tt to balance its period budget constraint.
2.6 Market-clearing
With the behaviour of all the economy’s agents fully specified, our model is closed by a
single market-clearing condition: output must be fully allocated across its three uses, namely
consumption, R&D, and the production of intermediate goods. That is,
Yt = Ct + It +
∫ Nt
0
Xjtdj
3 Balanced growth path
In order to characterize the long-run relation between growth and inflation, we need to find
our model’s balanced growth path (BGP). Along this path, the economy equilibrates such
that (i) all prices and quantities grow at constant, though potentially unequal, rates; (ii) the
consumption-to-output ratio Ct/Yt is constant; and (iii) aggregate labor Lt is constant. In
this section, we highlight some of the BGP’s key properties, then present a system that solves
for the BGP.
Price-setting along the BGP. The path’s key property viz-a`-viz price-setting in the intermedi-
ate good-producing sector is that P ∗t /Pt, the mark-up to which firms re-optimize, is constant
when growth is balanced. More specifically, the first-order condition for P ∗t (expression 2)
gives
P ∗t
Pt
=
σ/(1 + sX)
(σ − 1)

∑J−1
τ=0
{
β
(
1
g
) (σ−1)(1−α)
α
piσ
}τ
∑J−1
τ=0
{
β
(
1
g
) (σ−1)(1−α)
α
piσ−1
}τ
 (8)
where g = Yt+1/Yt is the long-run growth rate.
4 Furthermore, with all firms pricing in this
fashion, the sector’s average mark-up is constant and given by
∆Pt =
P ∗t
Pt
[
1
J
J−1∑
τ=0
(
1
pi
)τ(1−σ)] 11−σ
(9)
Wage-setting along the BGP. Within the labor market, our main observation is that W ∗t /Pt,
the real wage to which households re-optimize, grows proportionally with real output. More
specifically, the first-order condition on W ∗t (expression 3) gives
W ∗t
Pt
= Yt
[(
θ/(1+sL)
(θ−1)
)(
Ct
Yt
)(∑I−1
τ=0{β(pig)θ(1+ν)}τ∑I−1
τ=0{β(pig)θ−1}τ
)(
1−α
1
I
∑I−1
τ=0{pig}τ(θ−1)
)ν] 11+ν
(10)
4Along the BGP, consumption and investment grow at the same rate as output, while varieties Nt expand
at the rate g(1−α)(σ−1)/α and nominal wages at rate gpi.
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With wages for all services set in this manner, the average real wage also grows proportionally
with Yt and is given by
∆Wt =
W ∗t
Pt
[
1
I
I−1∑
τ=0
(
1
pig
)τ(1−θ)] 11−θ
(11)
These trends in W ∗t /Pt and ∆
W
t owe to growth driving down the marginal utility of real
income and the corresponding requirement that real wages rise in order for the BGP to elicit
a constant labor supply from households.
Intermediate good producers’ profits along the BGP. Turning to the intermediate good-producing
sector’s profits, we find that in period t firm j has real profits
Pjt =
(
Nt
(∆Pt )
σ−1
) 1−σ(1−α)
(σ−1)(1−α)
α
1
1−αLt
(
Pjt
Pt
)−σ (
Pjt(1 + s
X)
Pt
− 1
)
(12)
Therefore, since variety Nt expands along the BGP, profits associated with each variety fall
over time if intermediate goods are sufficiently substitutable (σ > 1
1−α) and rise if goods are
sufficiently complementary.
To understand why variety Nt exerts such an influence on the intermediate good-producing
sector’s profits, revisit the demand function for intermediate good j:
Xjt =
[
αL1−αt
(
Pjt
Pt
)−1]σ
X
1−σ(1−α)
t
From this expression we see that demand for j depends on the output of all other intermediate
goods via the aggregate Xt. For example, when goods are sufficiently substitutable (σ >
1
1−α),
an increase in the quantity of good i 6= j reduces demand for j through its impact on Xt. This
effect constitutes a demand externality in the sense of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
With this externality operating, any factor that impacts the aggregate Xt in turns affects
each intermediate good producer’s profits. Variety Nt qualifies as one such factor since, as
shown in subsection 2.1,
Xt = N
1
(σ−1)(1−α)
t
(
α
∆Pt
) 1
1−α
Lt (13)
that is, Xt rises with the variety of its components. Whether this effect causes profits to rise
or fall over time then depends on the externality’s direction, as determined by the inequality
σ ≶ 1
1−α .
Aside from linking profits and variety Nt in this way, the demand externality also links
profits to ∆Pt , our measure of the intermediate good-producing sector’s average mark-up. From
equation 13 we see that the aggregate Xt falls with ∆
P
t — that is, Xt falls with the average
mark-up at which its components are sold. Whether profits in turn rise or fall then depends
on the critical inequality σ ≶ 1
1−α .
R&D along the BGP. Given that the intermediate good-producing sector’s profits represent
an incentive for innovation, the model admits implications for R&D. To see this result, we
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substitute for profits in the innovator’s marginal condition (equation 4):
ηN ξt =
(
β
(
λt
λt−1
)
1−β
(
λt
λt−1
)
)(
Nt
(∆Pt )
σ−1
) 1−σ(1−α)
(σ−1)(1−α)
α
1
1−αLt
[
1
J
J−I∑
τ=0
(
P ∗t−τ
Pt
)−σ (P ∗t−τ (1+sX)
Pt
− 1
)]
(14)
Since innovation costs are on the left-hand side and its benefits on the right-hand side, we
see that both costs and benefits depend on Nt, though via different channels: for costs, this
dependence is inherent in the R&D technology, while for benefits it follows from the demand
externality.
This disparity has the potential to make equation 14 non-stationary, leading to unbalanced
growth. If, for example, ξ = 0 while σ < 1
1−α , then benefits would rise with Nt despite costs’
holding constant, making growth explosive. Thus balanced growth requires that ξ be set to
ensure stationarity in equation 14. That is, ξ must be chosen such that costs rise (or fall)
to offset the effects of the demand externality. This balance is achieved under the following
parameter restriction, which we borrow from Evans et al. (1998):
ξ =
1− σ(1− α)
(σ − 1)(1− α) (15)
Market-clearing along the BGP. Turning finally to the allocation of final output across its
various uses, we note that the BGP allocates a constant share of output to R&D. The share
of output allocated to the production of intermediate goods is also constant. It can be shown
that these shares are respectively given by
It
Yt
=
η(g − 1)
1 + ξ
(
∆Pt
α
) α
1−α 1
Lt
and ∫ Nt
0
Xjtdj
Yt
= α
(
∆Pt
)σ−1(P ∗t
Pt
)−σ(
1
J
J−1∑
τ=0
piτσ
)
so market-clearing implies that
Ct
Yt
= 1− α (∆Pt )σ−1(P ∗tPt
)−σ(
1
J
J−1∑
τ=0
piτσ
)
− η(g − 1)
1 + ξ
(
∆Pt
α
) α
1−α 1
Lt
(16)
Solution. Given parameters and a chosen value for trend inflation pi, expressions 1, 8, 9, 10,
11, 14 and 16 together constitute a stationary system of seven equations in seven unknowns.
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These unknowns are Lt, P
∗
t /Pt, ∆
P
t , W
∗
t /PtYt, ∆
W
t /Yt, g, and Ct/Yt, and the system is
Lt =
1−α
∆Wt /Yt
P ∗t
Pt
= σ/(1+s
X)
(σ−1)
 ∑J−1τ=0
{
β( 1g )
(σ−1)(1−α)
α piσ
}τ
∑J−1
τ=0
{
β( 1g )
(σ−1)(1−α)
α piσ−1
}τ

∆Pt =
P ∗t
Pt
[
1
J
∑J−1
τ=0
(
1
pi
)τ(1−σ)] 11−σ
W ∗t
PtYt
=
[(
θ/(1+sL)
(θ−1)
)(
Ct
Yt
)(∑I−1
τ=0{β(pig)θ(1+ν)}τ∑I−1
τ=0{β(pig)θ−1}τ
)(
1−α
1
I
∑I−1
τ=0{pig}τ(θ−1)
)ν] 11+ν
∆Wt
Yt
=
W ∗t
PtYt
[
1
I
∑I−1
τ=0
(
1
pig
)τ(1−θ)] 11−θ
η =
(
β
g−β
)(
1
∆Pt
) 1−σ(1−α)
1−α
α
1
1−αLt
[
1
J
J−I∑
τ=0
(
P ∗t /Pt
piτ
)−σ (
(P ∗t /Pt)(1+sX)
piτ
− 1
)]
(17)
Ct
Yt
= 1− α (∆Pt )σ−1 (P ∗tPt )−σ ( 1J ∑J−1τ=0 piτσ)− η(g−1)1+ξ (∆Ptα ) α1−α 1Lt
where equation 17 follows from the innovator’s marginal condition when we impose the pa-
rameter restriction from Evans et al. (1998).
4 Calibration
This section presents our baseline calibration. We begin with the parameters governing
nominal rigidity, namely J , the length of price contracts, and I, the length of wage contracts.
Taking each period as one quarter, we choose J = 2 in line with micro-evidence from Bils and
Klenow (2004). As for wage contracts, we set I = 4, consistent with the calibration in Erceg
et al. (2000), and Huang and Liu (2002), and estimation in Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets
and Wouters (2007). Further support for this value comes from Taylor (1999), which places
the average frequency of US wage adjustment at one year based on a review of the empirical
literature.
We realize that wage contract lengths are likely endogenous to the level of trend inflation.
However, research suggests that the relevant range of wage contract lengths is relatively nar-
row. Cecchetti (1987), for instance, finds that the average period between union wage changes
in the United States was about seven quarters in the 1950s and 1960s, when inflation averaged
around 2.2 percent, and then fell to four quarters in the 1970s, when inflation averaged around
7.1 percent (and sometimes reached double-digit levels). Moreover, Fregert and Jonung (2006)
found that in Sweden from 1908 to 2005, average contract lengths rarely fell below four quar-
ters, even in periods when inflation was relatively high. In this sense, our baseline case of
four-quarter wage contracts may represent a lower bound, and in any case section 6 will show
that our model still delivers a substantial growth-inflation linkage even if duration is halved
to two quarters.
The R&D parameter, η, is chosen so that real output grows at rate 3% per annum when
inflation is at 2.5%, broadly consistent with pre-crisis experience in the United States. As
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for ξ, we ensure balanced growth by setting ξ at the level implied by equation 15 when α
and σ are calibrated as follows. We choose α to give labor share 1 − α = 2/3 in final goods
production and set σ so that intermediate good producers facing 2.5% inflation re-optimize to
a 25% mark-up over marginal cost. The latter is consistent with micro-evidence supporting
mark-ups in the 10 to 40% range (Basu, 1996; Basu and Fernald, 1997). With α and σ assigned
these values, we find that σ > 1
1−α , so the demand externality of section 3 is negative implying
that intermediate goods are substitutable to the point that demand for good j falls with the
output of each good i 6= j.
In regard to the labor market parameters, the elasticity of substitution among labor ser-
vices, θ, is set to 12, consistent with the value reported in Kim (2000) and Basu (1996). The
degree of convexity in the disutility of labor, ν, is set to one, following Hornstein and Wolman
(2005).
Finally, we set the discount factor, β = 0.99, and choose subsidies sX , sL and sI to satisfy
equations 5 through 7 in subsection 2.5.
5 Results
With the model calibrated, we conduct a policy experiment by varying the rate of trend
inflation from −5 to 5% per annum and measuring how changes in this range impact the
economy’s BGP. Our main results concern inflation’s impact on the long-run growth rate
and are presented in subsection 5.1, while subsection 5.2 explores inflation’s implications for
welfare along the BGP. All rates reported in this section are quoted on an annualized basis.
5.1 Inflation’s impact on long-run growth
The long-run relation between growth and inflation is presented in Figure 1. Our most im-
portant finding is that inflation exerts a strong influence on growth: as inflation shifts from
−5 to 5%, the range over which the growth rate varies spans nearly 50 basis points, implying
up to a 15% output differential after thirty years. Our estimate of inflation’s impact on the
economy’s growth rate appears to be on the higher end of those reported in earlier work.
Gomme (1993), for instance, finds output growth to vary only by about 8 basis points over
his model’s optimal to 10% inflation interval. Dotsey and Ireland (1996) calculate a 20 basis
point decline in growth when their economy moves from the Friedman rule to 4% inflation.
We also find that maximum growth requires substantial deflation, namely at rate 3.15%.
What mechanism drives these results? Our model links growth and inflation via the
intermediate good-producing sector’s profits, since real profits represent an incentive for R&D
but are sensitive to changes in the price level. More formally, if we re-arrange the innovator’s
marginal condition as given in equation 17, we find that
g = β +
(
β
η
)(
Pt
N ξt
)
Growth is thus an increasing function of (variety-normalised) profits and so varies with inflation
to the extent that profits themselves vary with inflation. In particular, we isolate three channels
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through which inflation impacts profits:
Pt
N ξt
=
(
1
∆Pt
) 1−σ(1−α)
σ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
average
mark-up
effect
α
1
1−α Lt︸︷︷︸
labor
supply
effect
[
1
J
J−I∑
τ=0
(
P ∗t−τ
Pt
)−σ (P ∗t−τ (1 + sX)
Pt
− 1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
The direct effect captures inflation’s impact via quantities that firms choose directly, namely
the cohort-specific mark-ups P ∗t−τ/Pt, while the other two effects capture general-equilibrium
channels. More specifically, the average mark-up effect captures the demand externality’s role
in linking profits with the average mark-up ∆Pt , as explained in section 3, while the labor
supply effect captures the tendency for profits to rise with the amount of labor Lt available to
complement intermediate goods.5
The direct effect on growth is minimized at zero inflation, since inflation at this rate
eliminates the distortion associated with price rigidity, as in King and Wolman (1996).6 In
contrast, whether ∆Pt rises or falls with inflation depends on the balance of two countervailing
forces: as in Wolman (2001), higher inflation leads re-optimizing price-setters to “front-end
load” more aggressively, but it also accelerates real price erosion among non-re-optimizers.
Similar forces act on the average real wage ∆Wt , which determines Lt through equation 1. In
particular, higher trend inflation could reduce Lt by leading wage-setters to “front-end load”
and thereby increase the average wage-markup. In turn, the rise in the wage-markup reduces
availability of aggregate labor input Lt and thus profits. To resolve these ambiguities, we use
Figure 2 to plot our three effects against inflation.
From Figure 2, we see that these effects vary with inflation in disparate ways: the direct
and labor supply effects peak at zero and −3.09% inflation respectively, while the average
mark-up effect is consistently decreasing with inflation on the −5 to 5% range. This suggests
some tension in the relation between profits and inflation. For example, though zero inflation
uniquely facilitates optimal pricing for firms that take Lt as given, these firms also prefer
some deviation to a deflationary trend since it delivers higher Lt and thus higher profits via
the labor supply effect. Given that the profit-maximizing deviation involves inflation at a
rate slightly below that at which Lt is maximized, we conclude that the labor supply effect
dominates the growth-inflation linkage, with the average mark-up effect exerting a secondary
influence. This indicates that wage rigidity plays a key role in generating our growth results,
a point to which we return in section 6.
5An analog to this labor supply effect drives the results generated in Gomme (1993), Jones and Manuelli
(1995), Dotsey and Ireland (1996), and Gillman and Kejak (2005), among others, despite the fact that these
models abstract from nominal rigidity. In these models, growth is driven by investment in capital, physical
or otherwise, and labour complements capital in production; an inflation tax on wages then reduces labour
supply and thus retards growth via the return to capital. In some settings, the reduction in labour supply is
enhanced as households, aiming to economise on money holdings, reallocate their time to shopping and the
production of credit services.
6More specifically, along the BGP, a producer facing zero inflation is able to maintain the mark-up at the
level for which the producer would opt in a flexible economy. This can be verified from the intermediate good
producers’ first-order condition, given in equation 8.
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5.2 Implications for welfare
We now consider the implications of trend inflation for welfare along the BGP. Consumption-
equivalent welfare costs are graphed in Figure 3. We compute these costs relative to the
economy’s first-best BGP. More specifically, these costs give the percentage increase in each
period’s consumption needed to achieve first-best welfare.
We find welfare costs to be sizeable, reaching about 6% as we raise inflation from −5 to 5%.
Along this margin, the model generates relatively larger effects than earlier work in this
literature which focussed primarily on a transaction role for money to introduce an effect of
inflation on endogenous growth. Indeed, our baseline model generates a welfare cost of 4.7%
for an inflation rate of 4% relative to its optimal level, whereas Dotsey and Ireland’s M1
specification leads to welfare cost of about 3.1%. Gomme (1993) calculates a welfare cost of
approximately 0.02% when inflation moves from the Friedman rule to 10%. Moreover, we
find that maximum welfare requires substantial deflation, 3.14%, slightly different from the
growth-maximizing deflation rate (3.15%) mentioned in the previous section.
At this point it is useful to examine two questions. First, why does our model identify a
deflationary trend as optimal? Second, are inflation’s welfare costs specifically attributable
to the endogenous growth mechanism? (After all, with nominal rigidities operating, inflation
would prove costly even in a model with exogenous growth.) We answer these questions in
turn.
To understand the model’s prescription for deflation, note that with fiscal policy set as
specified in section 2, there exist only two obstacles to first-best outcomes, namely the dis-
tortions stemming from nominal price and wage rigidity. The distortion associated with price
rigidity is eliminated at zero inflation. On the other hand, as in Amano et al. (2009), deflation
at the rate of output growth is required to eliminate the distortion associated with wage rigid-
ity.7 We find that a deflation rate of 3.15% exactly offsets the economy’s growth rate. That
welfare peaks at 3.14% deflation then indicates that wage rigidity is a more important source
of distortion than is price rigidity. The model thus delivers a prescription for deflation without
accommodating a transactions role for money — that is, without appeal to Friedman’s rule.
To learn whether inflation’s welfare costs are specifically attributable to endogenous growth,
we decompose these costs as in Gomme (1993). With initial variety N0 normalised to 1, welfare
is given by(
1
1− β
)
log
(
Ct
N1+ξt
)
+
β
(1− β)2 log(g)−
(
1
1− β
)(
1
1 + ν
)∫ 1
0
L1+νit di
and thus depends on three factors, namely consumption, growth, and labor, respectively
captured by the stationary variables Ct/N
1+ξ
t , g, and
∫ 1
0
L1+νit di. To gauge each variable’s
contribution to welfare, we follow Gomme in asking what losses (or gains) would obtain if the
competitive BGP differed from the first-best BGP only in terms of that one variable. These
losses are plotted against inflation in Figure 4 and then summarized in Table 1. We see that
the contribution from growth dominates those from consumption and labor. At 0, 2, 5 and
10% inflation, the contribution from growth more than doubles the other two combined in
7More specifically, along the BGP, a wage-setter facing inflation at rate pi = g−1 is able to achieve a path
for real wage consistent with the one arising in a flexible economy. This can be seen from the wage-setting
condition, equation 10.
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absolute value. We thus conclude that most of inflation’s welfare costs indeed stem from its
effect on growth.8
6 Sensitivity analysis
Results for alternate calibrations are presented in Figures 5 and 6. In particular, Figure 5
reports growth and welfare results for alternate degrees of price and wage rigidity, while
Figure 6 documents the influence of other parameters.
Our main result in this section has to do with the importance of nominal wage rigidity.
In the left panel of Figure 5, the black dashed line gives the relation between growth and
inflation that would obtain if wage contracts only lasted I = 2 quarters, while the dotted red
line represents the case where wages are flexible (I = 1). The right panel of Figure 5 reports
welfare results in an analogous fashion. In both panels, our baseline results are given in solid
blue so as to facilitate comparison. We see that inflation still exerts substantial effects on
growth and welfare even when wage contract duration is halved to two quarters. However, if
we assume fully flexible wages, then inflation exerts virtually no effect on growth and welfare.
This is because the shift to flexible wages shuts down the labor supply effect, which section 5
identified as the main channel linking growth and inflation.
In contrast, we find that nominal price rigidity plays a smaller role in generating our results.
In Figure 5, the dash-dotted green lines give growth and welfare results for the case where
price contracts only last J = 1 quarter. We see that our results are essentially unchanged
under this alternate calibration.
We now turn our attention to the parameter θ, the elasticity of substitution among labour
services. In Figure 6, the black dashed lines report results for an alternate calibration under
which labour services are less substitutable, namely with θ = 4. In this case, as a given
service experiences real wage erosion, firms substitute towards that service less aggressively
than would otherwise be the case. The labor supply effect thus weakens, as does the growth-
inflation linkage.
On the other hand, our findings are relatively insensitive to changes in the parameter σ,
the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. In Figure 6, the dotted red lines
give results for the case where intermediate goods are less substitutable. In particular, we
have chosen σ such that firms facing 2.5% inflation now re-optimize to a 40% mark-up. This
adjustment leaves our results essentially unchanged.
For completeness, we finally consider an alternate calibration under which the disutility
of labour is less convex. In Figure 6, the dash-dotted green lines represent the case where
ν = 0.5. We find that this adjustment leaves our findings virtually unchanged.
To summarize: the magnitude of the growth-inflation is sensitive to degree of nominal
wage rigidity, along with a closely related parameter governing the substitutability of labour
services. This conclusion is similar to the finding that business cycle persistence in Huang
and Liu (2002) hinges critically on the calibration of labor market parameters. That wage
8Our results also suggest that models abstracting from endogenous growth are liable to understate inflation’s
welfare costs. Indeed, we find that previous models examining the effects of price and wage rigidity in the
presence of exogenous growth deliver costs much lower than those reported here. Amano et al., for example,
estimate that inflation in the 0 to 4% range elicits losses less than half those reported here. Canzoneri et al.
(2007) and Wing and Po (forthcoming) also report substantially lower losses.
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rigidity proves key to the emergence of a strong growth-inflation linkage extends a growing
literature on the importance of nominal wage inertia, including Erceg et al. (2000), Huang
and Liu (2002), Christiano et al. (2005), and Amano et al. (2009).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we used a version of the workhorse New Keynesian model to study the long-run
relation between growth and inflation. More specifically, we integrated Taylor price and wage
contracts into a benchmark model for endogenous growth through expanding variety. In this
setting, an intuitive mechanism links growth and inflation via the incentive to innovate. When
parameters are calibrated to standard values, the linkage is strong: the annualised growth rate
varies over a 50 basis point range as we adjust inflation from −5 to 5%, implying up to a 15%
differential in output after thirty years. Furthermore, inflation generates large welfare costs as
its growth effects compound. That sticky wages play a critical role in generating these results
extends a growing literature on the importance of nominal wage inertia. More generally,
our findings identify endogenous growth as a key channel via which inflation impacts New
Keynesian economies.
There are several directions in which our work can be extended. In particular, given
our emphasis on the effects of sticky wages, natural next steps would be to endogenize wage
rigidity and/or to introduce non-allocative wages. Furthermore, this paper isolated the effects
of nominal rigidity by assuming that subsidies were used to offset distortions associated with
imperfect competition and externalities in the R&D sector; future work could aim to consider
settings in which these subsidies are unavailable to policymakers.
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Figure 1: Long-run relation between growth and inflation
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Figure 2: Direct, average mark-up, and labour supply effects versus inflation
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Figure 3: Welfare costs of inflation
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Figure 4: Decomposition of inflation’s welfare costs
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Table 1: Decomposition of inflation’s welfare costs
Consumption-equivalent welfare losses (%)
-2% infl’n 0% 2% 5% 10%
Contribution from growth 0.05 1.82 4.95 11.75 27.23
Contribution from consumption 0.06 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.07
Contribution from labour 0.04 -0.78 -2.22 -5.16 -11.04
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis: wage and price rigidity
−5.00 −4.00 −3.00 −2.00 −1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
2.80 
2.90 
3.00 
3.10 
3.20 
3.30 
Trend inflation (% per annum)
L o
n g
− r
u n
 r e
a l
 o
u t
p u
t  g
r o
w
t h
 ( %
 p .
a . )
 
 
Baseline
Less rigid wages
Flexible wages
Flexible prices
−5.00 −4.00 −3.00 −2.00 −1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 
0.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
4.00 
5.00 
Trend inflation (% per annum)C
o n
s u
m
p t
i o
n −
e q
u i
v a
l e
n t
 w
e l
f a
r e
 l o
s s
e s
 ( %
)
 
 
Baseline
Less rigid wages
Flexible wages
Flexible prices
22
Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis: other parameters
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